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#China queue management system factory full#
#China queue management system factory Offline#

When compute nodes come online, they first check the network connectivity, then make multiple attempts to communicate with the preboot execution environment (PXE) server, to ensure that the correct network routing protocols can be applied. SQL telemetry also provided our first indication that some nodes were stuck during the boot up process. Our onsite datacenter team validated that stable power was feeding all racks immediately after the event, and verified that all devices were powered on.įollowing the restoration of power, our SQL monitoring immediately observed customer impact, and automatic communications were sent to customers within 12 minutes. After 1.9 seconds, the load moved to the redundant source automatically for a final time. This scenario of load transfers, to and from degraded UPS, over a short period of time, was not accounted for in the design. This logic prevented the STS from transferring back to the redundant power, after the primary UPS failed completely, which ultimately caused a power loss to a subset of the scale units within the datacenter – at 07:24 UTC, for 1.9 seconds. While the STS should then have transferred power back to the redundant UPS, the STS has logic designed to stagger these power transfers when there are multiple transmissions (to and from primary and redundant UPS) happening in a short period of time. So, after a 5-second retransfer delay, when the STS transferred from the redundant UPS back to the primary UPS, the primary UPS failed completely.

#China queue management system factory full#

In this degraded state, the primary UPS is unable to provide stable power for the full load. When the UPS rectifier failed, the STS successfully transferred to the redundant UPS – but then the primary UPS recovered temporarily, albeit in a degraded state. The STS is designed to remain on the primary source whenever possible, and to transfer back to it when stable power is available again. The UPS was connected to three Static Transfer Switches (STS) – which are designed to transfer power loads between independent and redundant power sources, without interruption. Although we have redundant UPS systems in place for added resilience, this incident was initially triggered by a UPS rectifier failure on a Primary UPS. The role of the UPS is to provide stable power to infrastructure during short periods of power fluctuations, so that infrastructure does not fault or go offline.

It is not uncommon for datacenters to experience an intermittent loss of power, and one of the ways we protect against this is by leveraging Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS). Zonal deployments of Service Bus and Event Hubs were unaffected.

Finally, non-zonal deployments of Service Bus and Event Hubs would have experienced a degradation.

Customers would have seen gradual recovery over time during mitigation efforts.

The majority of SQL Databases were recovered no later than 19:00 UTC.

SQL Databases with ‘active geo-replication’ were able to self-initiate a failover to an alternative region manually to restore availability.

SQL Databases with ‘auto-failover groups’ enabled were failed out of the region, incurring approximately eight hours of downtime prior to the failover completing.

While the vast majority of zone-redundant Azure SQL Databases leveraging were not impacted, some customers using proxy mode connection may have experienced impact, due to one connectivity gateway not being configured with zone-resilience.

while recovery began at approximately 16:30 UTC, full mitigation was declared at 19:00 UTC.

#China queue management system factory Offline#

Virtual Machines were offline during this time.Impact varied by service and configuration: This issue caused downstream impact to services that were dependent on these VMs - including SQL Databases, Service Bus and Event Hubs. While the majority rebooted successfully, a subset of these nodes failed to come back online automatically. This incident was triggered when a number of scale units within one of the datacenters in one of the Availability Zones lost power and, as a result, the nodes in these scale units rebooted. Between 07:24 and 19:00 UTC on 16 September 2023, a subset of customers using Virtual Machines (VMs) in the East US region experienced connectivity issues.